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ABSTRACT: The human brain appears to be the most complex structure for its size in the 
known universe. Consequently, studies of the brain have required many models and theories at 
many levels that involve disciplines from basic physics, to neurosciences, psychology and 
philosophy. For over 2000 years the two most controversial and unresolved models of brain 
phenomena involve what we call free will and consciousness. I argue that adequate models at all 
levels require epistemic complementarity – distinct necessary models that are not derivable or 
reducible to each other. The primitive irreducible complementarity at all levels is the subject-
object distinction required by an epistemic cut. This complementarity first arises with self-
replication where a self, the subject, must be distinguished from the non-self, the object. 
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A strategy of basic physics research is to thoroughly understand the simplest case 
before attacking the hardest case.  I have found that by exploring the meanings of 
subject and object, symbols, and phenomena at the level of the cell, their meanings can be 
more clearly understood at the higher evolved levels (Pattee, 1969, 1982). 
This strategy means that to understand the foundations of human consciousness, 
one should first understand awareness, which requires understanding the senses, which in 
turn requires understanding the fundamental subject-object relation and the origin of 
phenomena and symbols (Pattee, 2015). Full understanding must also involve their origins 
and evolution. There are other reasons I do not find human consciousness as the most 
instructive, productive, or dependable level to begin a study of foundations. 
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First, from an evolutionary perspective consciousness, as understood at the higher 
levels, does not appear to have any necessary role in any individual organism being 
alive.1 
Second, there is very little knowledge, and certainly no agreement, about when or 
why any level of self-awareness or consciousness first evolved. Third, the cognitive 
sciences now provide convincing evidence that the phenomena that appear to our 
conscious mind are only a small fraction of the brain’s unconscious perceptual and 
cognitive activity. There are many levels of consciousness, and what appears at any 
conscious level is under the control of the unconscious brain. We have no dependable 
subjective access to any of the preconscious processing that results in conscious 
phenomenon (e.g., Churchland, 2002; Changeaux and Dehaene, 2011).  
Fourth, most of our basic sensorimotor activities are unconscious, such as 
grasping, walking, gesturing, etc. At higher cognitive levels there is also good evidence 
that great discoveries in mathematics, physics, and creativity in the arts arise in the 
unconscious mind by unknown abductive search and incubation processes that appear 
in consciousness as a sudden epiphany.2 
Fifth, conscious attempts at introspection are often deceptive and always reach a 
dead end. 
 Sixth, there is no fundamental physical theory that involves a conscious observer. 
This includes quantum measurement. 
Finally, in context of the long-term evolutionary future of our species, the 
adaptive value of phenomena appearing to human consciousness is far from clear. The 
expressions of conscious thought, which include reason, religion, the arts and sciences 
are certainly impressive, and are considered as the species’ greatest accomplishments. 
On the other hand, they are also responsible for deadly ideological conflicts and 
Promethean technologies that over evolutionary time scales have no certain or obvious 
survival value. So far, the lower species that lack the human level of consciousness 
have a far longer record of survival.  
The phenomenologist’s first objection to this approach is to point out that all our 
knowledge, including theories of evolution, physics, and the neurosciences, is still 
1 “It [individuality] depends not on consciousness, but on being; not on thought, but on life; it depends on 
the individual's empirical development and manifestation of life, which in turn depends on the conditions 
existing in the world” (Karl Marx, 1895).  
2 “It is certain that the combinations which present themselves to the mind in a kind of sudden 
illumination after a somewhat prolonged period of unconscious work are generally useful and fruitful 
combinations . . . all the combinations are formed as a result of the automatic action of the subliminal 
ego, but those only which are interesting find their way into the field of consciousness” (Poincaré, 1914). 
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ultimately derived from subjective human phenomena, which are our only source of 
experience. This is obviously the case, but to the physicist this raises the most 
interesting problem. The interesting problem is how these subjective phenomena 
correspond to what does not depend on subjective experience. Physics call this 
objective knowledge. Any concept of subject or self implies the existence of an object or 
non-self. For physics the relation of subject to object has always been the fundamental 
problem.  
Of course this problem implies an epistemology that recognizes the subject/object 
distinction, and that is the issue I am going to discuss first because it is the basis of the 
interpretations of quantum mechanics.  
Interpreters of quantum mechanics very often do not distinguish the unique quantum mechanical problems 
from the general epistemic problems that apply to all knowledge. Here are four important general 
examples: (1) the subject-object epistemic cut, (2) reversible vs. irreversible models, (3) 
deterministic vs. probabilistic models, and (4) general complementarity of models. 
It is the subject/object distinction that stands out in the measurement problem in 
quantum mechanics because the object requires a quantum description and the subject 
requires a classical description. Where this essential distinction is made Heisenberg 
called the Schnitt, John Bell called the shifty split, and I call the epistemic cut to emphasize 
that it is not an ontological dualism. 
What is often not understood is that the subject-object distinction and the 
epistemic cut is not just a problem of quantum mechanics. Born, von Neumann, and 
others have explained why there must be an epistemic cut in any measurement process. The 
reasons are: First, no laws can tell you what to measure or when to measure it. Second, 
measuring devices are special boundary conditions, and like initial conditions they are not 
derivable from or reducible to laws. Von Neumann explained that lumping system S 
and measurement apparatus M as one system (S + M) without a cut would require a 
new M1 to measure new initial conditions – a process leading to an infinite regress. 
Von Neumann’s point was that this regress can be terminated only by choosing, 
seemingly arbitrarily, an epistemic cut – a separation of the system and measuring device, or 
more specifically, the separation of the record of a measurement (a symbol) from the 
physical event the symbol represents. This is not just QM. It is a requirement for any 
empirically testable theory. 
That this boundary [the cut] can be pushed arbitrarily deeply into the interior of 
the body of the actual observer is the content of the principle of the psycho-
physical parallelism -- but this does not change the fact that in each method of 
description the boundary must be placed somewhere, if the method is not to 
proceed vacuously, i.e., if a comparison with experiment is to be possible. (von 
Neumann, 1955, p.420). 
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QM has nothing to do with the necessity of an epistemic cut. 
My second issue is the reversible/irreversible complementarity. All treatments of 
quantum measurement emphasize the reversibility of fundamental laws and the 
irreversibility of measurements. But this is the case for all measurements (detections, 
records, symbols, etc.). All microscopic laws are reversible. The logician Emil Post 
noted that symbols have no dynamics. Symbols are created in time but preserved as 
timeless structures. All results of measurements are symbols. The reversing of a symbol 
is meaningless, because the symbol’s relation to its referent is only an interpreter’s 
convention. Again, quantum theory has nothing to do with measurements being 
irreversible. 
The third issue is the “collapse of the wave function”, also considered a central 
issue in quantum measurement. But again, in any irreducibly probabilistic model there 
will be an epistemic “collapse” of the state’s probability distribution with any new 
information, i.e., measurement. This is a more obvious problem in QM, but it is a 
property of all probabilistic models.  
Born explained that classical physics was probabilistic because measurements cannot be 
exact. He has argued that epistemic determinism is untenable or meaningless, and that 
ontologic determinism is undecidable. Born (1959): “In view of uncertainties concerning the 
initial conditions due to inevitable experimental imprecision the predictions of classical 
mechanics never describe a unique trajectory but rather a group of trajectories defined by a 
probability distribution. The true task of mechanics is to predict the evolution of this 
distribution with time.” 
For this reason, “the concept of determinism is unacceptable” (even without 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty).  
In his Nobel lecture, Born further emphasizes the importance of fallibility.   
I believe that ideas such as absolute certitude, absolute exactness, final truth, etc. 
are figments of the imagination which should not be admissible in any field of 
science. On the other hand, any assertion of probability is either right or wrong 
from the standpoint of the theory on which it is based. This loosening of thinking 
seems to me to be the greatest blessing which modern science has given to us. For 
the belief in a single truth and in being the possessor thereof is the root cause of 
all evil in the world. (C. S, Peirce would agree.) 
Einstein would partly agree: “In so far as the propositions of mathematics are 
certain they do not apply to reality; and in so far as they apply to reality they are not 
certain.” 
This was his epistemic belief, but clearly not his ontologic belief.  
Any irreducible probabilistic model cannot predict exactly the explicit symbolic 
outcome of a particular experiment, which while obeying the probabilistic model is not 
itself a probability, but a definite classical symbol. However, while the symbolic result 
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is explicit, it is not exact if the measured observable is continuous. Even if the result is 
discrete, there is a finite probability that it is incorrect. (This was Peirce’s argument for 
his tychism.)   
According to Schrödinger and all the EPR experiments, the crucial difference (and 
conceptual problem) of QM is non-locality and entanglement. There is no adequate 
classical analogy. There is also the underlying issue of the interpretation of a 
probability, primarily whether it is real (objective) or nominal (subjective).  
The fifth issue is Bohr’s complementarity principle which was originally applied to 
quantum theory; but his general complementarity principle of irreducibility applies to 
all models. There is no model of everything. For example, you cannot formally derive a 
probabilistic model from a deterministic model (Weyl, Planck, von Neumann, see 
Appendix), or an irreversible model from a reversible model, or a discrete model from 
a continuous model. The hierarchy principle requiring different models at different 
levels applies to both classical and quantum theory: Different levels of organization are 
defined by their different models. Classical levels are particle dynamics, statistical 
mechanics, thermodynamics, structural chemistry, and the solid state. Lower level 
models apply to higher levels, but are not adequate for understanding higher levels. 
QM applies to all these levels, but QM alone is not an adequate model at higher levels. 
Hierarchies require complementary models. Bohr believed that complementarity “bears a 
deep-going analogy to the general difficulty in the formation of human ideas, inherent in the distinction 
between subject and object.” 
In spite of much evidence, the idea of the necessity two irreducible and often 
inconsistent models is often rejected on philosophical grounds. It still surprises me that 
the the necessity of general complementarity of models is so controversial, because it is 
evident that one universal model of reality does not exist, and everyone uses more than 
one model of their experiences even in everyday life. Nevertheless, much of the 
literature in many scientific fields is full of unproductive arguments over which 
of several complementary models is correct or superior to the others.  
For example, a physicist, a phenomenologist, or any subject, can believe with 
confidence that the image of an objective lawful universe must exist as a construction of 
the conscious subject’s material brain, which can influence matter as a boundary 
condition without violating these laws. At the same time the subject can with similar 
confidence believe that the material lawful universe existed before life and brains 
evolved, and therefore there are laws that are independent of the subject’s 
consciousness, or in fact independent of life and boundary conditions. The 
complementarity of these two models is clear. Trying to eliminate either belief is a useless 
enterprise. 
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As I mentioned earlier, different hierarchical levels require irreducibly 
complementary models. In physics a change of scale in space, time, or energy of 
several orders of magnitude usually requires new observables and a new model, and 
current physics models cover over 60 orders of magnitude. Also, formal mathematical 
structures can be interpreted as having complementary literal and metaphorical 
meanings. There is still no consensus on the foundation of mathematics. I believe there 
is a good reason: there are many necessary complementary foundations. Why should 
there be only one? 
In biology the structure-function complementarity is a universal necessity. Function 
cannot be logically derived from only a structural description, and a structure cannot 
logically be derived from only a defined function. In evolutionary terms, structure-
function relations appear to be “discovered” by natural selection and often appear as 
frozen accidents. Animals recognize discrete objects and continuous motion in 
separate regions of the brain, and neither region would make sense without the other.  
The general concept goes back at least to Heraclitus’ upward-downward path 
describing the same path and to Aristotle’s four complementary causes. Nicholas of 
Cusa was more explicit with his coincidentia oppositorum − unity of opposites. Euler 
pointed out that the Creator’s laws can be described equally well by time-dependent 
efficient cause (time-dependent state-determined equations) or final cause (timeless 
extremum principles). 
The complementarity of discrete and continuous models is a fundamental aspect 
of the symbol-matter problem. Evolution prepared the simplest brains to distinguish 
discrete objects from the continuous motion of objects, thereby allowing effective 
sensorimotor control. Our everyday experience as well as classical physics is based on 
a clear and objective distinction between discrete particles and continuous motion, 
which are processed in different regions of the brain. Modern science depends on 
artificial instruments that have extended our senses many orders of magnitude beyond 
what our brains can recognize without cognitive dissonance. It is not reasonable to 
expect to eliminate this dissonance of complementarity by adding new concepts and 
patterns. 
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APPENDIX NOTES 
H. Weyl, 1949:  . . . we cannot help recognizing the statistical concepts, besides those 
appertaining to strict laws, as truly original. (p. 203). 
Max Planck, 1960: For it is clear to everybody that there must be an unfathomable gulf 
between a probability, however small, and an absolute impossibility (p. 64) Thus dynamics and 
statistics cannot be regarded as interrelated (p. 66).  
Einstein on complementary epistemologies: 
Einstein (1949). “Epistemology without contact with science becomes an empty scheme. Science without 
epistemology is—insofar as it is thinkable at all—primitive and muddled. However, no sooner has the 
epistemologist, who is seeking a clear system, fought his way through to such a system, than he is inclined to 
interpret the thought-content of science in the sense of his system and to reject whatever does not fit into his system. 
The scientist, however, cannot afford to carry his striving for epistemological systematic that far. He accepts 
gratefully the epistemological conceptual analysis; but the external conditions, which are set for him by the facts of 
experience, do not permit him to let himself be too much restricted in the construction of his conceptual world by 
the adherence to an epistemological system. He therefore must appear to the systematic epistemologist as a type of 
unscrupulous opportunist: he appears as realist insofar as he seeks to describe a world independent of the acts of 
perception; as idealist insofar as he looks upon the concepts and theories as free inventions of the human spirit (not 
logically derivable from what is empirically given); as positivist insofar as he considers his concepts and theories 
justified only to the extent to which they furnish a logical representation of relations among sensory experiences. He 
may even appear as Platonist or Pythagorean insofar as he considers the viewpoint of logical simplicity as an 
indispensable and effective tool of his research.”  
Hertz (1894) was also clear on the limits of subjective knowledge: “As a matter of fact, we 
do not know, nor have we any means of knowing, whether our conception of things is in 
conformity with them,” except by how our subjective images correspond to our experience.  
Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464): If the transcendental is accessible to us only through the medium of 
images and symbols, at least let the symbols be as distinct and unambiguous as mathematics will permit. (De 
docta ignorantia)  [Predating Galileo by 150 years: The laws of nature are written in the language 
of mathematics.] 
Laws and measurements are communicable only by symbol systems 
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Planck, 1936: It is not therefore the case, as is sometimes stated, that the physical world 
image can or should contain only directly observable magnitudes. The contrary is the fact. The 
world image contains no observable magnitudes at all; all that it contains is symbols.  
Weyl, 1949: However, the only decisive feature of all measurements is, it seems, symbolic 
representation; even numbers are in no way the only useable symbols. 
Born, 1964: Symbols are the carriers of communication between individuals and thus 
decisive for the possibility of objective knowledge.  
Misunderstanding of the “Copenhagen Interpretation” 
Quoted from “Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics” at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-copenhagen/#MisCom 
Second, many physicists and philosophers see the reduction of the wave function as an important part of the 
Copenhagen interpretation. But Bohr never talked about the collapse of the wave packet. Nor did it make sense for 
him to do so because this would mean that one must understand the wave function as referring to something 
physically real. Bohr spoke of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, including the state vector or the 
wave function, as a symbolic representation. 
Bohr's own words: “in each case [of measurement] some ultimate measuring instruments, like the scales 
and clocks which determine the frame of space-time coordination on which, in the last resort, even the definitions 
of momentum and energy quantities rest, must always be described entirely on classical lines, and consequently 
kept outside the system subject to quantum mechanical treatment” (Bohr, 1939)  
What characterizes a frame of reference is that it has a well-defined position and a well-defined momentum, 
and treated classically measuring instruments act exactly as frames of reference. The implication is that Bohr did 
not exclude the application of quantum theory to any system. Every system can in principle be treated quantum 
mechanically, but since we always need a frame of reference to describe experimental outcomes, not all systems can 
be treated quantum mechanically at once. 
